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Abstract 
The management of the oil sector in Nigeria over the year has left much to be desired owing to the unacceptable 
scale of corruption and poor management. The decay in the oil sector due to systematic neglect of the refineries, 
corruption, inept management, stealing, and vandalization of oil installations (pipelines, flow stations, 
operational equipments, etc,) have left the oil industry in a dire state calling for desperate reforms and measures. 
The paper showcases the scale of decay in terms of corruption and poor infrastructure with the discovery of 
trillions of Naira in purported expenditure on fuel importation that never came to the country; the paper also x-
rays the managerial structures in the oil industry and their impacts on the sector itself. The seed data for analysis 
was provided by the audit report by an independent firm: KPMG & S.S. Afemikhe & Co.; government published 
data on financial disbursement and published empirical data on Nigerian oil industry from independent sources. 
The paper also attempts to define the scope of the problematic by scratching below the surface of identified 
causes and problems and concludes by presenting some possible leeway out of the economic, social and political 
quagmire, which includes the exercise of the political will for the enablement of the rule of law to strengthen the 
various anti-corruption institutions and their statutory powers. 
Keywords: Oil subsidies, Deregulation, Corruption, Managerial Structures, Fuel Importation, Authoritarianism, 
Neo-patrimonialism.   
 
INTRODUCTION:  
The perennial fuel crises in Nigeria are not unconnected with the systemic problems of corruption, inefficient 
management and governmental ineptitude. Coupled with the low capacity of the refineries that had become 
outdated, militancy and outright stealing of crude oils, the nation is forced to cope with production, supply and 
accountability difficulties. Over the years, periodic hikes in the pump price of petroleum products: petrol, gas, 
kerosene and diesel, has yet to bring about the much needed stability in the production-supply chain. The 
problem generated by the situation forced the federal government, acting on the boisterous tide of public opinion, 
to institute an investigation through an independent audit report which is summarized below, with its damaging 
contents, as result of the discovery of large scale financial fraud and economic malfeasance. The report shows a 
systematic process in which corrupt practices have become institutionalized into the civil service bureaucratic 
structures of government, to the extent that crude oil sales and refined products import figures are inaccurate, 
inconsistent and poorly accounted for. Take a cursory look at the following audit report:         
 
THE FUEL SUBSIDY FRAUD CRISIS: THE DAMAGING KPMG AUDIT REPORT. 
The federal government of Nigeria hired in July 2010, the audit firms of KPMG and S.S. Afemikhe & Co, to look 
into the books of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation[N.N.P.C.] following what the 36 state governors 
alleged as wrongful deductions at source by the NNPC to fund its operations.  The most important aspects of the 
41-page report as far the goal of this paper is concerned are summarized below, as stated by the audit firms:  
 
The report made the following observations:  
 That the NNPC ‘deliberately’ turned the itself into an established drain pipe on the nation’s oil and gas 
earnings, and also an avenue for perpetrating corruption and fraud;  
 That the NNPC also got itself enmeshed in sharp business practices, violation of laid down rules and 
regulations, illegal deduction of funds belonging to the states, and failure to account for several billions 
of naira meant for the federation account; 
 That the NNPC has also defrauded the country in its subsidy claims. The firms, for instance, found that 
between 2007 and 2009, the NNPC over-deducted funds in subsidy claims up to the tune 28.5 billion 
naira. This according to the report it has not been able to account for ever since. 
 That the Federal Government, national lawmakers and Nigerians having observed that: “ the procedures 
for managing and reporting the country’s crude oil and gas revenues are opaque and characterized by 
gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies in the role of key parties responsible for assessment, collection and 
reporting on these revenue streams”, the need to look into the gaping holes of NNPC’s  undertaking 
became necessary. 
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Subsidy Deduction on Locally Produced Petrol.  
 The report alleged further that the NNPC illegally deducted subsidy funds from the proceeds of locally-
produced petrol which was not the intention of the subsidy programme. The auditors comment further: 
 “We observed that NNPC’s subsidy claim and PPPRA’s verification are based on volume of petroleum 
products available for sale which comprises volume of products imported and actual production from 
the refineries, as against duly verified volume of products lifted out of the depots, meaning volume of 
petroleum products sold as stipulated in the subsidy guidelines”.  
 Furthermore, the audit report goes on to state that the implication of this unwholesome practice was 
“the payment of subsidy on products not consumed by end users due to losses from pipelines vandalism, 
theft etc”. these auditors also told the government in their “rough estimation of subsidy payments on 
product losses for the period under review, 2007-2009, 11.8 billion naira was paid out (as subsidy). 
They also informed the federal government, in their report (auditors) that the practices going on at the 
NNPC had the risk of payment of subsidy on locally refined products which was not the intent of 
subsidy and that it encourages inefficiency”. 
 The auditors also discovered that there were instances of delays in receipts of subsidy advance from 
PPPRA (Petroleum Products Pricing and Regulatory Authority) and this resulted in estimation of 
subsidy claims by the NNPC, which leads to under/over deduction from the proceeds of domestic crude 
sales, the report added. 
 Instances of illegal over-deductions. 
SUBSIDY DEDUCTIONS BY THE NNPC vis-à-vis PPPRA’s APPROVALS  
(2007, 2008 & 2009). 
 The auditors’ report further states that “based on our analysis, subsidy over-deduction for 2007, 2008 
and 2009 was estimated at 2billion, 10.3billion and 16.2billion naira respectively, stating further that 
high risk of loss of subsidy adjustment trail specifically in instances of under remittance”. For instance, 
in 2009, subsidy deduction in September amounted to 25billion naira, whereas PPPRA’s approval was 
23.8billion naira.  In November of the same year, subsidy deduction was in the region of 35billion as 
against PPPRA’s approval of 21.3billion naira. Over-deduction for the two months (September and 
November) amounted to 14.9billion naira. However, the audit report discovered of the amount over-
deducted (14.9billion), only 4.2billion was paid into the federation account by the NNPC as adjustment 
for subsidy claimable for the two months under review.  
 The Foreign Exchange Fraud :  
 The report further observed that the “NNPC is invoiced in United States Dollars (USD) for domestic 
crude allocations but is expected to remit the equivalent naira value to the Federation Account. 
However, “we observed that exchange rates used by the NNPC were lower than the average exchange 
rates published by the CBN (Central Bank of Nigeria) during the review period”. According to the 
report, exchange rate variances for 2007, 2008 and 2009 were estimated at 25.7billion, 33.8billion and 
26.7billion naira, respectively (based on CBN rates for those months). However NNPC sources claimed 
it obtained the exchange rates from CBN by phone and without any document to support its claims.  
 The report also queried the sloppy manner NNPC contracts for the sale of crude are renewed every year. 
It says: “evaluation criteria for renewal of contracts are not clearly stated in the contract 
document…..the selection exercises were based on individual discretion and wrong assumptions and 
criteria”. This to the auditors’ report is a clear negation of globally acceptable rule of corporate 
governance”.  
 That the sudden change of exchange rates from the dollar to the naira at the point of remittance to the 
Federation Account amounts to deliberate fraud and corruption (emphasis mine). But the big question 
raised by the report is: what happens to the differential resulting from the deliberate and systematic 
lowering of exchange rates (emphasis mine) which runs into billions of dollars?  
 The report further discovered that crude production consistently exceeds OPEC’s quota/commercially 
allowable volume of 1,673,000 barrels per day (bpd) for a six-month period as observed (April-
September, 2010).  
 That there was no centralized location for storing electronic copies of historical production and 
allocation data. Rather, the report adds that they are stored in personnel (individual) work stations.  
 
 In concluding their report, the auditors states that “based on our analysis, subsidy over-deduction for 
2007, 2008 and 2009 was estimated at 2billion, 10.3billion and 16.2billion naira respectively, stating 
further that high risk of loss of subsidy adjustment trail specifically in instances of under remittance”. 
For instance, in 2009, subsidy deduction in September amounted to 25billion naira, whereas PPPRA’s 
approval was 23.8billion naira.  In November of the same year, subsidy deduction was in the region of 
35billion as against PPPRA’s approval of 21.3billion naira. Over-deduction for the two months 
Journal of Energy Technologies and Policy                                                                                                                                      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3232 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0573 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.9, 2015 
 
35 
(September and November) amounted to 14.9billion naira. However, the audit report discovered the 
amount over-deducted (14.9billion), only 4.2billion was paid into the federation account by the NNPC 
as adjustment for subsidy claimable for the two months under review.  
Meanwhile, in another development, the upper chamber of the federal legislature, The Senate, in its 
committee’s probe report on the subsidy fraud reveals that while the sum of 256billion naira was budgeted for 
subsidy payment in 2011, over 1.36billion naira was actually spent in violation of statutory procedures and 
financial regulations by the end of the year. This figure was confirmed by the Honourable Minister for Finance, 
Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala who also doubles as the coordinating Minister for the National Economy.  
The whole essence of the institution of an audit investigation into the oil business transactions is to 
discover the scale or extent of corruption as it affects the economy and general development in Nigeria. From the 
audit report, it is obvious that corrupt practices exist on a grand scale within the petroleum sub-sector of the 
Nigerian economy.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK. 
The scale of corrupt practices in the oil sector and among Nigerian public officials and politicians in general can 
better be understood if the trends, methods, patterns and scale can be explained by logical scientific means and 
explanations. A number of theoretical explanations and proposals have been employed or developed to provide 
explanatory tools for understanding the endemicity and pandemicity of corruption in the public sector in Nigeria. 
Such explanatory theories range from the sociological, psychological to the biological.   
Most sociological explanations tend to analyze the impact of social values on the individual’s character 
and personality formation. Scholars of functionalist extraction such as Emile Durkheim, Auguste Comte, 
Ferdinand Tonnies, and Max Weber were concerned with the anomic conditions that resulted from the moral 
anarchy brought about by social change in the aftermath of the introduction of technology and its attendant 
necessities for division of labour and specialization.  Hence, the industrial revolution that broke in the 1750s 
impacted on the social cohesion of the western societies that those societies suffered from what Giddens (2009: 
941) calls “structural tensions and a lack of moral regulation”, which predisposes certain individuals in the 
society to criminality. This situation occurs because the rate of technological transformation of the society, 
especially economic production systems, outpaced human comprehensibility of the ramifications of the 
unfolding technological tornados that ravaged societies.  The immediate consequence was anomie or anarchy 
and a breakdown of the moral constitution of society (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]). Durkheim’s main proposition is 
that both crime and deviance are social facts and represent inevitable and necessary components of modern 
industrial societies (Giddens, ibid.). Merton (1968) deployed the concept of ‘anomie’, just like Durkheim to 
explain according to Anthony Giddens, the kind of “strain put on individual’s behaviour when widely accepted 
cultural values conflict with their lived social reality”.  
Amundsen (1999:1) in a paper, Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues quotes ‘The 1997 
World Bank Development Report’ as stating thus: “an effective state is vital for the provision of the goods and 
services- and the rules and institutions- that allow markets to flourish and people to lead healthier, happier lives. 
Without it, sustainable development, both economic and social is impossible’ (The World Bank, 1997:1). 
Therefore, there is relationship between political and administrative reforms, on the one hand, and the level of 
corruption on the other. Hence to understand corruption, there is the need to understand the role of the state and 
politics. Amundsen (ibid. 2) states that represents a perverted state- society relation, in which state officials play 
vital role. Quoting Mery (cited in de Sardan 1999:49) he sees corruption as “a form of secret social exchange 
through which those in power (political or administrative) take personal advantage, of one type or another, of the 
influence they exercise in virtue of their mandate or their function”. This definition is supported by that of Colin 
Nye’s, described by Amundsen as classical due to its wide usage: “behaviour which deviates from the formal 
duties of a public role because of a private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status 
gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence”(Nye, 1967:417). 
These definitions are further supported by the “abuse of public power”(The World Bank, 1997) and Khan’s 
definition of corruption as “behaviours that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the action of 
someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power, or 
status”(Khan, 1966:12), as quoted by Amundsen.      
In explaining his approach to understanding corruption, Amundsen talks about what he calls the theory 
of redistributive corruption vis-à-vis the theory of extractive corruption.  In the former, “the state is the 
weaker part of the in the state-society relationship. Here, various social and economic groups, interests or 
individuals are organized and powerful enough to draw more benefits from the corrupt practices they engage in 
with the state as a counterpart, than is the state and the ruling elite”. Nigeria, Bangladesh and Russia are very 
good examples where private interest groups, businesses, whether local or foreign are able to purchase national 
resources cheaply through what Amundsen calls “exceptions, privileges, immunity and impunity through the use 
of kickbacks and mafia methods…”(ibid.). In the end, he says the system of redistributive corruption hurts 
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mainly the poor, and beneficiaries of corruption “depends on the local distribution of forces”. In the latter i.e. 
extractive corruption, the corollary is the case in which “the state is seen as the stronger partner in the state-
society relationship”. This according to Amundsen, is where the ruling elite, representing the strongest force in 
the society, “uses the apparatus as its instrument to extract resources from the society, and does so for the benefit 
of the rulers”. In the case of oil corruption in Nigeria, the ruling classes usually position their cronies, political 
stooges and the corps of ethno-cultural sycophants in key positions facilitates the pillage of public resources, in 
most cases with impunity. With the backing of state power, the treasury is the king’s delight, as Louis XIII 
allegedly once remarked at the height of power drunkenness: “I am the state and the state is me”. This is based 
on the political dictum of Aristotle which states that” power corrupts but absolute power corrupts absolutely”. 
The attempt by the ruling classes in Nigeria to protect corruption has led to increasing tendency towards 
authoritarianism in government. Hence, Nigerian rulers gravitate from a government based on the rule of law to 
one based on the rule of force; the former defined as ‘democratic rule for the benefit of the entire population 
‘and the later (rule of force) defined as ‘an authoritarian, perverted and corrupted form of rule for the advantage 
of the ruler, which could be a tyrant or an oligarchy [Amunsden, ibid, based on Aristotle, 384-322]. This is the 
reason why there is no accountability in the ruling of the oil industry in Nigeria. Nigeria remains the largest and 
seventh largest producer of oil in Africa and the world respectively with an average daily production figures of 
between 2.5-3.0million bpd, but characterized by large scale stealing of crude oil. This has been confirmed by 
the audit report discussed earlier. Therefore, the bane of the oil industry and by implication the Nigerian 
economy is authoritarian rule based on neo-patrimonialism. Corruption as a social problem has equally been the 
focus of attention of several authors who dwelt on its various aspects and implications for society (such authors 
are: de Sardan, 1999; Heidenheimer et al, 1989 & 1993; Heidenheimer, 1996; Medard, 1997; McNulty,1999; and 
Bayart et al, 1997).                
Table 1: A TYPOLOGY OF MODES OF INDIVIDUAL ADAPTATION. 
Modes of Adaptation Cultural Goals Institutionalized Means 
I.Conformity            +                             + 
II. Innovation            +                             - 
III.Ritualism              -                            + 
iv.Retreatism             -                            - 
v.Rebellion.             +_                             _+ 
 
Robert K. Merton: Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press. 1968 Enlarged Edition.   
Conceptualizing corruption becomes a difficult issue given the differing positions of various scholars involved in 
its definition and epistemology. The differences are occasioned by the ideological and scholastic orientations. 
The World Bank, an economic, financial and research institution, quoted by Usman and Rufa’i (2010:267) in 
Wuam and Sunday (eds, 2010), provides a fairly broad conceptual definition of corruption as follows:  
       Corruption means the abuse of public office, for private gain. Public office is abused 
       for private gain when an officer accepts, solicits or extorts a bribe. It is also     abused   
       when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes 
       for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for     personal  
       benefit, even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism. (8-9). 
The conceptualization of corruption above is focused on corrupt practices mainly among civil   servants in 
respect of an attempt to influence public policies and processes for personal or sectional gains by the officials. 
For instance, Adebisi (2011), states that public officers received a whooping US$3billion in 2010 which 
represents a sizable percentage of the 2010 Federal Appropriation Bill. Given this scenario, if civil servants 
become economic looters and plunderers themselves rather than being the watchdogs, then Nigeria’s 
developmental aspirations will continue to be a mirage or pipeline dream.  
This situation, which is symptomatic of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, is reflected in Annan’s frustration 
that corruption remains at the top of societal problems by the turn of the 20th century. Annan (1999) puts the 
frustration thus:  
        When, in a society, the shameless triumph, when principles end and only  
 Opportunism prevails, when the insolvent rules and the people tolerate it,  
 when everything becomes corrupt but the majority is quiet because their 
 slice is waiting…perhaps it is time to review our activities, re-evaluate those 
  around us, and return to ourselves.          
Transparency International (1998), a non-governmental agency and watchdog on corrupt practices the world 
over, observes that:  
  “Corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It undermines good government, 
fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and 
private sector development and particularly hurts the poor”. 
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 “ Corruption is understood as everything from the paying of bribes to civil servants in return for some favour 
and the theft of public purses, to a wide range of dubious economic and political practices in which politicians 
and bureaucrats enrich themselves and any abusive use of public power to a personal end” (Amundsen, 1999). 
 
Table 2: List of Companies Owed by the NNPC 
Firms Amount Owed (US million). 
1 Glencoe $138million. 
2 Vitoe $198million. 
3 Trafigura $53million. 
4 Calson(possibly a subsidiary of Vitoe)  $115.11million. 
5 Napoli ( a partner of Trafigura) $75.6million.  
6 Glencoe & Mercuria $3.5billion. 
 GRAND TOTAL $4.1BILLION 
Source: saharareporters.com/news-page/mismanaged-nigerian-state-oil-company-nnpc-racks-news-debts.  
Given the billions of petrol dollars available to Nigeria from oil revenue, there is no justification for incurring 
these huge sums of debt and making the poor to pick the bill in form of subsidy removal. In fact, by 2012, the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the flagship of Nigeria’s oil industry went cap-in-hand to 
both local and foreign bankers for another round of US$1.5billion syndicated loan with a collateral of 15,000 
bpd (barrel per day)(Reuters). This scale of corruption is possible only in a system where there is high degree of 
inefficiency, ineptitude in governance, and widespread lack of accountability, caused by the existent culture of 
impunity. This is the Nigerian situation where appointed officials of government collude with both local and 
foreign businessmen and criminals to systematically fleece the country of billions of dollars. The 
saharareporters.com’s report identifies a number of causative factors that made this scenario possible: a). 
decades of corruption and mismanagement which had plunged the NNPC into heavy debt; b). its failure to build 
requisite refining capacity to meet domestic needs. 
The mess in the oil industry puts the NNPC in a complicated demand and supply quagmire and to 
extricate itself from social and political backlash, it must import expensive fuel from the global oil market, 
mainly from very distant Venezuela in South America. This is what corruption has caused Nigeria.  
 
THE COMPLICIT ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL OIL COMPANIES. 
Writing on “Nigeria and Oil”, Shah (2012) posits that “there is a symbiotic relationship between the military 
dictatorship and the multinational companies who grease the palm of those who rule…” according to him, “they 
are assassins in foreign land. They drill and they kill”. The Anglo-Dutch oil giant, Shell BP, was evidently 
complicit in the execution by hanging of the Ogoni Nine by the General Sani-led military junta. A prominent 
member of those executed was the renowned playwright and environmentalist Ken Saro-Wiwa. The implication 
of corruption in the oil industry of Nigeria is that the violence, militancy and insecurity across the country, 
especially in the Niger Delta, the northern Boko Haram killings of mainly Christians and kidnappings are 
symptomatic of unchecked corruption. 
 It is therefore scientifically rational to hypothetically assume a causative nexus between unbridled corruption 
and popular revolts and nationalist or pseudo nationalist/ideological movements in Nigeria. Omeje’s report on 
“Oil Conflict and Accumulation Politics in Nigeria”, states that: 
  Since the mid-1990s, the minority ethnic communities of  
  the oil-bearing Niger Delta region…have waged a formi- 
  dable struggle of unrelenting violent protests, including oil 
   theft, pipeline sabotage, and kidnappings.   
The structural pattern of corruption-generated crises is cyclical in nature, i.e. corruption breeds crises and crises 
breed further corruption. The trend continues on and on but like a wheel rolling towards the edge of the abyss. 
The January 2012 anti-oil subsidy fraud protests that nearly completely shot down Nigeria for more than a week 
forced the federal government to make a list of oil marketers who allegedly collected funds from government 
without importing the required amount of fuel needed for the domestic economy. The protests had its epicentre 
in the commercial city of Lagos, which hosts a vibrant and radical opposition and civil society organizations. 
More than two million protesters converged on Lagos streets to the extent that the federal government had to 
deploy soldiers to Lagos. Government’s panicky reaction to the protests is understandable given the structural 
character of the protesters: academics, the clergy (Christian and Muslim), musicians, students, artisans, civil 
servants, and the army of jobless youth, etc. 
After it was able to pressure the trade union leaders to back down on the protests, the embattled 
government whose political ego had been badly bruised horridly published a list of defaulting oil marketers, 
which appears in THE NATION Monday, January 23, 2012. 
Journal of Energy Technologies and Policy                                                                                                                                      www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3232 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0573 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.9, 2015 
 
38 
Table 3: THE 38 OIL FIRMS IMPLICATED IN THE OIL SUBSIDY FRAUD PUBLISHED BY THE 
EFCC [ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIME COMMISSION]. 
1 OANDO NIG. PLC. N228.506B 
2 INTEGRATED OIL AND GAS N30B 
3 MRS N224.818B 
4 A.A.RANO N1.14B 
5 A-Z PETROLEUM N18.61B 
6 A.S.B. N3.16B 
7 ARCON PLC  N24.116B 
8 AFRICAN PETROLEUM N104.58B 
9 AMINU RESOURCES N2.3B 
10 CAPITAL OIL N22.4B 
11 CON OIL N37.96B 
12 AVANTEGUARD N1.14B 
13 AVIDO N3.64B 
14 BOFFAS AND COMPANY N3.67B 
15 BRILLA ENERGY N960.3M 
16 D. JONES PETROLEUM N14.86B 
17 DOWNSTREAM ENERGY N789.648M 
18 DOSIL OIL AND GAS  N3.375B 
19 INCO RAY N1.988B 
20 ETERNAL N5.574B 
21 FOLAWIYO ENERGY N113.32B 
22 FRADO INTERNATIONAL N2.63B 
23 FIRST DEEPWATER OIL N257.396M 
24 HEDEN PETROL N693M 
25 HONEYWELL PETROL N12.2B 
26 AMP N11.417B 
27 ASCON N5.271B 
28 CHANNEL OIL N1.308B 
29 FORT OIL N8.582B 
30 ENAK OIL & GAS N19.684B 
31 BOVAS & CO. NIG LTD N5.685B 
32 OBAT OIL N85B 
33 AP N104.5B 
34 IPMAN INVESTMENT LTD N10.9B 
35 ACON N24.1B 
36 ATIO OIL N64.4B 
37 AMP N11.4B 
38 EMAC OIL N19.2B 
 GRAND TOTAL                                      N1.3TRILLION 
SOURCE: THE NATION, Monday, January 23, 2012.p.6 [A Nigerian Daily] 
In spite of this huge sum of public funds devoted to oil subsidy, representing approximately a quarter of the 
budget, there was nothing on ground to show that the fuel supplied actually matched the fund allocated to the 
marketers as shown in table 3 above. To justify the fuel price increase, government promised to dedicate the 
funds to be recouped from its unpopular subsidy removal policy to funding various development projects across 
the country. A comprehensive tabular analysis of funds to be allocated is presented tables 4-12 of the appendix. 
However, a year and a half after the pronouncement, there is nothing to show on ground as far as development 
projects are concerned. 
 
THE RETURN OF THE INDICTED OIL MARKETERS.  
A new report shows that the number of fuel suppliers has increased from 30 to 40 but curiously the list contains 
five oil marketers that had been previously indicted for oil import fraud. THE NATION  Newspapers of 
Wednesday July 24, 2013, named the following indicted fuel importers among the new list of importers: Nepal, 
MRS, Fresh Synergy, Ibafon and Techno. The report shows that in 2012 about 1 Trillion Naira (US$6.2Billion) 
which represents about 20% of the federal budget was expended on fuel subsidy. The report submits further that 
fuel subsidy obviously facilitated corruption as about US$6Billion was allegedly spent on fuel subsidy but that 
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50% of expected fuel import never arrived. 
Meanwhile, of the 232 billion naira fraudulent claims and was expected to be returned to the covers of 
government, only 14 billion naira, representing about 6% has so far been recovered by government. Also, oil 
companies such as Vitol, Mercuria, and Trafigura, which traditionally played key role in fuel importation, have 
been substituted by some local firms, such as OANDO Plc, which won the biggest allocation of 135,000 tonnes; 
while TOTAL and FOLAWIYO, in which global commodity merchant GLENCOE holds minority share were 
allocated 90000 tonnes each.  
     
SUBSIDY REINVESTMENT AND EMPOWERMENT PROGRAMME (SURE-P) AND THE 
GRANDSTANDNING NATION-WIDE PROJECT PROPOSALS. 
The following projects distributed across 12 tables are expected by government to be funded from the money 
saved from net increase in oil prices as a result of subsidy removal. The projects range road construction and 
rehabilitation, hydro-power, refineries, irrigation, railway lines, rural and urban water supply, and increased 
allocation of petrol-dollar monies to the 36 states, Abuja (The Federal Capital Territory) and 774 local 
government areas. Much has yet to be seen on the ground to justify the huge financial resources that have been 
earmarked for these ambitious and politically-motivated projects that accord little regards for economic viability. 
Two years on since the subsidy protests, the scale of corrupt practices has been upped as new cases have been 
uncovered within the NNPC and the government. The suspended Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, 
Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, a scion and heir apparent of Kano royal dynasty alleged recently that the sum of twenty 
billion dollars (US$20bln) was missing from the Federation Accounts as it was unremitted. The CBN Governor 
over the years has attempted to distance himself from the corruption-riddled federal government led by the 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP). This has created tension between the CBN on one hand, and the Presidency 
cum National Assembly on the others. He once openly defended official statistics to show that the National 
Assembly consumes about 25% of the National budget (approximately over one trillion naira); a situation said 
was not good for the economy.        
 
CONCLUSION 
The focus of this paper has been on the fraud associated with oil subsidy and the deregulation of the downstream 
subsector of the oil industry. The paper examined the systematic fraud perpetrated by the sectoral managers of 
the NNPC, PPPRA and relevant governmental agencies. The mismanagement of the oil and gas sector created a 
huge shortfall in the financial resources needed for infrastructural development across the country, when Nigeria 
is classified as the largest and seventh largest producer of oil in Africa and the world respectively. This is also in 
spite of the rebasing of Nigeria’s economy which makes it the largest economy on the African continent, with a 
value of US$510billion. Unfortunately, successive governments in Nigeria have paid mere lip service to the call 
by the citizenry for government to tackle corruption frontally. Increasing authoritarianism in governance based 
on neo-patrimonialism facilitates high level of corruption in Nigeria.  Today, Nigeria remains one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world. This paper believes that any meaningful attempt at fighting corruption must be 
based on the rule of law that governs every Nigerian citizen, big or small. This can only be possible when the 
empowerment process is transparently democratic and basically broad-based.    
 
APPENDIXES I-IX: The tables here represent the various projects to be addressed by monies realized from the 
removal of subsidies on petroleum products (so-called SURE-P projects spread across the country. In actual fact, 
some of these projects have awarded and re-awarded by previous administrations, for example, Lokoja-Abuja 
road dualization contract that had been awarded by the Obasanjo Administration; East-West Road project started 
during President Umaru Yar’adua amongst others. 
 
Appendix i 
TABLE 4: EAST WEST ROAD SECTIONS 
S/N EAST- WEST ROAD DISTANCE 
1. Section 1, Warri – Kaiama 87km 
2. Section 2.1  Kaima – Ahoada 47km 
3. Section2.2, Ahoada-Port Harcourt  54km 
4. Section3, Port Harcourt  99km 
5. Section 4, Uyo-Calabar 51km 
 TOTAL  338km 
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Appendix ii 
TABLE 5: LIST OF ROAD PROJECTS 
S/N ROADS/BRIDGES DISTANCE ZONE 
1. Abuja-Abaji-Lokoja Dual Carriageway  200km NC 
2. Benin-Ore-Sagamu Dual Carriageway  295km SW/SS 
3. Onitsha-Enugu-Port Harcourt Dual Carriageway   317km SE 
4. Kano-Maiduguri Dual Carriageway  510km NW/NE 
5. Construction Of Oweto Bridge 2km NC 
6. Construction of 2nd Niger Bridge 2Km SS/SE 
 TOTAL  1,326KM  
 
Appendix iii 
TABLE 6: LIST OF RAILWAY PROJECTS 
S/N ROUTES DISTANCE 
COVERED 
ZONE 
1. Lagos-Ibadan Standard Gauge (Dual)  174km SW 
2. Abuja-Kaduna Standard Gauge  187km NC/NW 
3. Port Harcourt-Umuahia-Enugu-Makurdi-Lafia-Kuru-
Kafanchan-Jos-Bauchi-Gombe-Maiduguri   
2,119km SS/SE/NC/NE 
4. Zaria-Funtua-Gusau-KauralNamoda 221km NW 
5. Lagos-Ibadan-Ilorin-Jebba-Minna-Kaduna-Zaria-Kano 52km FCT-Abuja 
 TOTAL 3,877KM  
 
Appendix iv 
TABLE 7: LIST OF SOME OF THE IRRIGATION PROJECTS 
S/N Projects Hectarage Output(TONS/YEAR) Zone 
1. Lower Anambra, Anambra 3,850 25,000 SE 
2. Adani Rice, Enugu  1,000 12,500 SE 
3. Abakaliki (Item Ikwo), Ebonyi 500 12,500 SE 
4. Peremabiri, Bayelsa  2,000 18,000 SS 
5. Itu Irrigation, Cross River  500 8,000 SS 
6. Kolo, Bayelsa  500 18,000 SS 
7. Middle Ogun, Oyo State 1,000 20,000 SW 
8. Lower Ogun, Ogun State 1,000 20,000 SW 
9. South Chad, Borno  3,300 40,000 NE 
10. Lower Chad, Yobe 1,700 20,000 NE 
11. Chouchi, Adamawa 1,000 20,000 NE 
12. Lower Taraba (Donga) 500 18,000 NE 
13. Doma, Nasarawa 1,000 20,000 NC 
14. Tada Shonga, Kwara 3,000 25,000 NC 
15. Auyo, Jigawa 2,000 18,000 NW 
16. Longkat, Plateau  1,000 12,000 NC 
17. Bakolori, Zamfara 2,000 50,000 NW 
18. Gurara, Kaduna 2,000 25,000 NW 
19. Zauro Polder, Kebbi 1,000 40,000 NW 
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Appendix v 
TABLE 8: LIST OF SOME RURAL AND URBAN AND REGIONAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECTS 
S/N PROJECTS STATES 
1. Aba/Umuahia Abia  
2. Greater Onitsha Anambra  
3. Abakaliki/Ishiagu Ebonyi 
4. Okrika/Port Harcourt  Rivers 
5. Central Ogbia  Bayelsa  
6. Fugar, Okpella  Edo 
7. Ilesha/Ile Ife Osun 
8. Abeokuta  Ogun 
9. Little Osse Ekiti  
10. Biu Borno 
11. Damaturu  Yobe  
12. Gombe Gombe  
13. Bauchi  Bauchi  
14. Mangu  Plateau  
15. Okene/Lokoja  Kogi  
16. Langtang  Plateau  
17. Zobe Katsina  
18. Zaria Kaduna 
19. UsmanDanFodio  Sokoto S 
20. Karu/Mararaba Nasarawa  
21. Dutse   Jigawa  
22. FCT  Abuja 
 
Appendix vi 
TABLE 9: LIST OF SOME HYDROPOWER PROJECTS 
ID PROJECT TITLE WATTAGE LOCATION 
LAGE HYDROPOWER PROJECT  
1 Mambilla Hydropower Project 2,600MW Taraba 
SMALL AND MEDIUM HYDROPOWER PROJECTS 
1. Waya  Small Hydro power Plant 0.15MW Bauchi 
2. Mbowo Small Hydro Power Plant 0.125MW Enugu 
3. Ikere Gorge Small Hydro Power Dam 9MW Oyo 
4. Oyan Small Hydro Power Dam 9MW Ogun 
5. Bakolori small Hydro Power Dam 3MW Zamfara 
6. Tiga Dam 6MW Kano 
7. Challawa Dam 6MW Kano 
8. Jibiya Dam 3MW Kastina 
9. Doma Dam 5MW Nassarawa 
10. OWENA Dam 3MW Ondo 
11. Goronyo Dam 6MW Sokoto 
12. Kampe Dam 2MW Kohi 
13. Zobe Dam 3MW Katshina 
14. Kashimbilla Dam 40MW Taraba 
15. Dadin Kowa Small Power Plant 34MW Gombe 
16. Ogwashiukwu Dam 1MW Delta 
17. Galma Dam 10MW Kaduna 
 
Appendix vii 
TABLE 10:  
S/N LOCATION OF REINERY PROCESSING CAPACITY (BBLS/DAY) 
1. Oloibiri Baelsa 100,000 
2. Ibogiri, Kogi 100,000 
3. Lekki Free Trade Zone, Lagos 200,000 
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Appendix viii 
TABLE: 11 
2012 PROJECTED DISTRIBUTION OF STATE GOVERNMENTS’ SHARE BASED ON CRUDE OIL 
PRICE OF US$90 PER BARREL 
S/NO  STATE  ALLOCATION  
=N=000 
1 ABIA     7,460,062.24 
2 ADAMAWA     7,093,217.24  
3.  AKWA IBOM   43,406,731.87 
4.  ANAMBRA    7,164,697.14 
5.  BAUCHI      8,309,652.09  
6.  BAYELSA   33,839,652.09  
7.  BENUE     7,659,631.38 
8.  BORNO     8,451,350.27 
9.  CROSS RIVER     7,718,686.26 
10.   DELTA  40,965,476.92 
11 EBONYI    5,880,552.17 
12 EDO    9,432,709.30 
13 EKITI    5,931,760.50 
14 ENUGU    6,692,449.99 
15 GOMBE    6,291,166.08 
16 IMO    8,729,126.56 
17 JIGAWA     7,848,086.61 
18 KADUNA    8,944,553.13 
19 KANO 11,210,304.04 
20 KASTINA    8,525,402.69 
21 KEBBI    7,131,000,67 
22 KOGI    7,113,202.30 
23 KWARA    6,482,037,63 
24 LAGOS 10,126,514.01 
25 NASSARAWA   6,073,343.25 
26 NIGER   8,294,895.04 
27 OGUN   6,932,554.10 
28 ONDO 12,554,345.10 
29 OSUN   6,575,162.77 
30 OYO   8,283,911,05 
31 PLATUE   6,956,827.74 
32 RIVER  44,628,272.62 
33 SOKOTO   7,395,670.79 
34 TARABA   7,005,145.87 
35 YOBE   6,952,382.78 
36 ZAMFARA    6,973,520.31 
 TOTAL : 411,034,176.00  
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Appendix ix 
TABLE 12: 
2012 PROJECTED DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ SHARE   
BASED ON CRUDE OIL PRICE OF US$90 PER BARREL  
S/NO  STATE  ALLOCATION  
=N=000 
1 ABIA  4,238,037.28 
2 ADAMAWA  5,453,941.40 
3.   AKWA IBOM   7,192,651.57 
4.  ANAMBRA  5,406,502.22 
5.  BAUCHI    6,252,967.94  
6.  BAYELSA   2,300,560.20  
7.  BENUE  6,357,999.06 
8.  BORNO  7,307,086.59 
9.  CROSS RIVER  4,540,847.09 
10.   DELTA  46,001,812.30 
11 EBONYI 3,235,045.01 
12 EDO 4,544,886.73 
13 EKITI 3,697,048.21 
14 ENUGU 4,380,299.45 
15 GOMBE 3,196,301.41 
16 IMO 6,342,352.58 
17 JIGAWA  6,654,099.65 
18 KADUNA 7,136,961.50 
19 KANO 11,712,750.53 
20 KASTINA 8,563,272.60 
21 KEBBI 5,319,281.53 
22 KOGI 5,513,261.00 
23 KWARA 4,234,044.54 
24 LAGOS 7,114,676.51 
25 NASSARAWA 3,388,143.83 
26 NIGER 6,865,934.91 
27 OGUN 5,080,656.46 
28 ONDO 4,689,711.39 
29 OSUN 6,391,233.41 
30 OYO 8,172,704.52 
31 PLATUE 4,678,163.80 
32 RIVER  6,125,835.15 
33 SOKOTO 5,872,227.28 
34 TARABA 4,674,398.11 
35 YOBE 4,533,026.64 
36 ZAMFARA  4,225,704.32 
37 FCT- ABUJA  1,811,053.26 
  TOTAL  203,235,480.00 
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